We evaluate two main views on pursuing financial stability within a flexible inflation-targeting regime. It appears that potential gains from an activist or precautionary approach to promoting financial stability are highly shock dependent. We find support for the conventional view that concern for financial stability generally warrants a longer target horizon for inflation. The preferred target horizon depends on the financial stability indicator and the shock. An extension of the target horizon favoring financial stability may contribute to relatively higher variation in inflation and output.
Introduction
We investigate the macroeconomic implications of pursuing financial stability within a flexible inflation-targeting framework. Flexible inflation-targeting allows a central bank to pursue additional objectives such as output stabilization and financial stability when setting interest rates; see e.g. Svensson (1999) .
There are two main views on how financial stability can be promoted under an inflation-targeting regime. The conventional view is that an inflationtargeting central bank should respond to variables linked to financial stability to the extent they affect (observed and expected) inflation and/or output; see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Bean (2004) . It is argued that stabilization of inflation and output provides a substantial contribution to financial stability as well. An abrupt unwinding of asset price misalignment or financial imbalances may, however, lead to financial instability and, as a consequence, macroeconomic instability. In such a scenario, financial and macroeconomic stability could be taken into account by choosing a longer target horizon than out of concern for inflation and output stabilization alone; see e.g. Bean (2004) .
The alternative view favors a more activist or precautionary approach, assuming that a monetary policy response to inflation and output may not be sufficient to achieve financial stability. Hence, a direct response to variables affecting or representing financial stability is advocated for precautionary reasons. It is argued that imbalances in financial markets and asset prices may well develop in situations with stability in inflation and output. Thus, monetary policy may not respond sufficiently to secure financial stability when financial imbalances or bubbles in asset prices are building up; see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002) and White (2006) . 1 A subsequent correction in asset prices, and hence a fall in collateral values, may reduce lending, which may give rise to unfavorable boom-bust cycles in investment and output; see e.g. Bordo and Jeanne (2002) . Furthermore, a fall in bank shareholders' wealth and a possible credit crunch, if banks become more risk adverse, may have a strong negative impact on output; see e.g. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) . If the underlying development triggers a financial crisis, the costs in the form of both financial costs and output losses may be high; see e.g. Aziz et al. (2000) , Bordo et al. (2001) , Hoggarth et al. (2002) and Schwierz (2004) .
To examine the merits of the two views, we characterize monetary policy in two different ways. In order to model monetary policy in line with the activist approach, we characterize monetary policy by a simple Taylor (type) rule that is augmented with two indicators representing excess financial vulnerability. In addition to contributing to financial stability, an extended Taylor (type) rule may perform better than a simple Taylor rule in terms of inflation and output stability for two main reasons.
First, the interest rate response may become better attuned to the shocks behind fluctuations in output and inflation. Ideally, the interest rate response should be shock-dependent, as suggested by the literature on optimal monetary policy rules. An interest rate rule that only admits response to inflation and output gaps may imply an interest rate response that is in disproportion to
